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European defence policy today is centred around two topics: strengthening Europe’s own defence capability and supporting Ukraine. While the Russian aggression in Ukraine began in 2014, it took the full-scale war in 2022 to wake up Europeans to the new normal. War is back in Europe, and its expansion cannot be ruled out.

By 2025, the level of risk, complexity and uncertainty has increased compared to 2022. Europeans face a dual challenge. The security environment is more dangerous than ever since the Second World War, while the transatlantic relationship is changing.

Russia is reconstituting its military capabilities faster than expected. In Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated its readiness to take great risks despite huge losses and to use extensive military force against civilians and vital societal functions in pursuit of its political goals.

Europeans face a dual challenge. The security environment is more dangerous than ever since the Second World War, while the transatlantic relationship is changing.

The Trump administration is seeking a clear division of labour: the US will focus on homeland defence and the Indo-Pacific, while Europeans need to take larger responsibility of European security, including Ukraine.

How well will the EU, NATO and European nations cope with this dual challenge? This question is particularly crucial for smaller European countries like Finland.

The EU and NATO have not remained idle. On the contrary, we are witnessing a dynamic phase of deepening defence cooperation within the EU. The White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2035 outlines new avenues to close capability gaps after decades of underinvestment. Through the ReArm Europe plan, Member States can unlock additional funding for national defence budgets and to take Commission-guaranteed loans to facilitate joint procurement, altogether up to 800 billion euros. Importantly, many of these initiatives allow participation of key partners, including UK, Norway and Ukraine.

NATO has systematically strengthened its deterrence and defence, while simultaneously increasing its support to Ukraine. For the first time since the Cold War, there are detailed operational plans in place to deter and defend the area of the Alliance. Other key elements of NATO’s adaptation include new, threat/risk-informed Capability Targets, development of command and control arrangements and the NATO Force Model to generate more forces at higher readiness levels.

Instead of a European alternative to NATO, we need to build a more European NATO.

However, more needs to be done, and urgently. What should the Europeans do to seize this moment, the Hour of Europe? The following five points should guide the way forward:

• Increase European and Alliance-wide understanding of Russia as a long-term threat to European security. Russia’s objectives remain unchanged, both with regard to Ukraine and the wider European security architecture. Russia will continue to strive for a great power status and spheres of influence, including through military means.
• Fulfil the NATO 5% target and sustain the high level of defence spending long into the future – a very demanding but necessary task. This will require tough political decisions in Allied capitals, preceded by inclusive parliamentary processes and serious engagement with the public.
• Continue to develop EU and NATO in a mutually complementing manner, relying on their respective strengths. NATO remains the foundation of collective defence, as only it has the machinery to plan and, if needed, to implement collective defence. The EU has a wider toolbox, including economic and legislative instruments that NATO does not possess, and initiatives to promote European defence capabilities and defence industry. There is no time and money to be wasted on duplication. Instead of a European alternative to NATO, we need to build a more European NATO.
• Keep the US on board. The continued US commitment to NATO, including its nuclear deterrence, remains critical. While NATO will become more European, it will be a gradual process. Europe cannot fully replace US capabilities in the short or medium term particularly in areas such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets and deep-precision strike capabilities.
• In the end, it all comes down to Member States. Neither the EU nor NATO can solve these challenges unless nations take their commitments seriously and contribute accordingly. It is high time to increase defence spending and turn the investments into concrete projects.

Karoliina Honkanen is the Director of the Defence Cooperation Unit at the Ministry of Defence of Finland.

Ministry of Defence of Finland is an official partner of Helsinki Security Forum 2025.