Publications

Indeed, Europe’s energy crisis is not just about security. It affects every aspect of the ‘energy triangle’ – sustainability, affordability and equity, as well as security.

The sustainability crisis was for everyone to see in the summer. While the EU continued to burn large volumes of fossil fuels (often originating from dubious partners), unprecedented heatwaves and protracted droughts affected almost the entire continent and caused an estimated 10,000 excess deaths. The ramifications for the resilience and security of European energy systems are also clear. Drought affected hydropower production and river-based transport. Nuclear reactors in France and Hungary were switched off due to the lack of cooling water at a time of peak electricity demand linked to air conditioning. As far north as Poland, coal-fired power plants had to be put offline due to insufficient water in the Vistula River to cool them.

Europe’s energy security will no longer come from fossil fuels.

The economic side of the energy triangle is affected by both security and climate. The supply crises and the uncertain outlook have driven up energy prices, which in turn have led to generalised inflation. The cost of this situation is borne disproportionately by poorer Europeans and may further benefit anti-establishment parties, with elections looming in key EU member states in 2027. Meanwhile, beyond hindering the production of hydro- and nuclear power and causing spikes in electricity demand, the climate crisis has a wider effect on the European economy. Costs have been estimated at 1% of GDP in the summer of 2026 alone and may reach 5–7% in Southern and Central European economies by 2030. At a time of growing geoeconomic competition, the EU’s competitiveness is negatively affected by energy costs that are higher than those of many of its competitors.

In order to tackle this conundrum, Europe must consider a few essential facts in the energy-climate nexus. First, it is the fastest-warming continent with the largest cumulative historical emissions, together with the United States. Both present-day challenges and historical responsibilities require the EU to take urgent climate action. Second, Europe’s energy security will no longer come from fossil fuels. The unreliability of suppliers and supply routes, the sheer cost of fossil energy and the impact of further emissions on the continent have made this abundantly clear.

Paradoxically, resistance to ambitious climate action has been increasing. This is driven by the lobbying of energyintensive industry and industrial farming, rather than just the fossil fuel sector and the far right. Their positions are being mainstreamed in centre-right parties, which are turning their back on the European Green Deal, arguing that it places too great a financial and bureaucratic burden on companies.

Both present-day challenges and historical responsibilities require the EU to take urgent climate action.

However, it is becoming evident that the costs of inaction are higher. Europe is now, more than ever, faced with a transition imperative, dictated by both climate- and security-related realities. Continued attempts to dilute jointly agreed energy and climate targets will only slow the EU’s low-carbon development, widening the technological gap with China, undermining competitiveness and ensuring dependence on increasingly unreliable fossil fuel supply chains.

The EU must fully harness no-regret measures such as energy efficiency improvements and greater grid interconnectivity, while prioritising public support for innovation and clean technologies and ending subsidies for the fossil fuel sector. It must ensure the democratic legitimacy of the transition by providing direct income support and social protection measures to those disproportionately affected by price hikes or investment needs.

A coordinated effort, similar to that required by institutions and civil society during the Covid-19 pandemic, is necessary to facilitate the transition by adapting lifestyles and society, thereby also boosting resilience. A multilateral approach is also necessary to respond adequately to the global challenge of climate change and accelerate the energy transition. Hence, the EU must continue efforts to directly address the global climate crisis, building upon multilateral frameworks while also pushing for partnerships with other major actors such as China, Brazil, Japan and India.

None of the measures proposed here are fully novel. Most of them are included in the European Green Deal launched in 2019. Instead of diluting them, the EU should use them as a foundation for further ambition. Ultimately, not just the security, affordability and sustainability of energy systems depend on these efforts; it is a matter of Europe’s overall resilience in the face of an unprecedented climate crisis.

Why does this matter now?

Europe is facing a second major energy supply shock in four years, while climate change is simultaneously increasing the economic and security costs of relying on fossil fuels.

What needs to change?

Europe needs to address energy security, affordability and climate action as interconnected challenges.

What needs to be done?

The EU should improve energy efficiency and grid connections, invest in clean technologies, protect those most affected by the transition, end fossilfuel subsidies and strengthen international climate cooperation.