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NATO member countries have agreed to increase their defence and security-related spending to 5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). But increased spending alone without the manpower to back it up could undermine Europe’s military preparedness in the long run.

A recent poll of nine European countries published by the European Council on Foreign Relations found that in several countries, including France, Germany and Poland, majorities support reintroducing mandatory military service. Currently, nine EU member states have military conscription (Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden).  In the last several months, Western European politicians, including in Germany and in the United Kingdom, have publicly pondered the benefits of returning to mandatory military service, reopening the debates to reintroduce military conscription.

Why does conscription matter?

Months after Trump embraced Putin in Alaska, the Ukraine peace effort seem to be going nowhere. The Ukraine peace effort seem stalled, and Russia shows no signs of abandoning its long-term strategic ambitions. At the same time, China’s assertiveness, instability in the Middle East, and hybrid threats targeting Europe’s critical infrastructure remind us that deterrence must be multidimensional.

Technology and industrial investment are not a panacea. So, it forces Europe to ask fundamental questions: Do we have the human capital to sustain modern war? Can societies generate the “will to defend” when technological superiority alone may not guarantee victory? Europe’s answer to these questions will determine whether it remains a credible security actor in its own right – or whether it remains dependent on external powers at a time when such dependence may prove catastrophic.

Conscription plays a greater role in securing Europe than any other initiative that seeks to increase merely material capabilities.

As NATO deterrence hinges on the credibility of its collective will to fight, the issue of force generation ranks at the top on the global defence agenda alongside military scalability among allied countries. Analysts suggest that European armed forces might need to expand by up to 300,000 troops on top of the existing 1.47 million to ensure credible deterrence against Russia. As such, conscription plays a greater role in securing Europe than any other initiative that seeks to increase merely material capabilities. While drones, cyber capabilities, and precision strikes redefine the battlefield, they do not substitute for the human will to fight. Without motivated and prepared citizens, even the most advanced platforms remain hollow instruments. Therefore, while material investments are necessary, without manpower – and the will to defend—they are insufficient. Thus, conscription, when framed as part of a broader social contract, provides not just manpower but civic cohesion.

Conscription as a social contract

Conscription has resurfaced as a central notion of total defence and a ‘whole of society’ approach to security and defence. At the core of the total defence concept is societal engagement. Indicatively, one analysis of the Baltic States’ policies, posits that Latvia and Lithuania reintroduced conscription as ‘a social contract between society and the state’. While Lithuania restored conscription in 2015, Latvia legislated a return to compulsory service in 2023 with implementation from 2024, after only abolishing it in 2007.

Mass and precision

The contemporary debate over conscription sits at the fault line between quantity and quality – between expanding manpower to create mass and investing in technologies that promise precision and efficiency. Often framed as a trade-off between manpower and technology, conscription is more crucial now than before. Modern warfare shows that mass and technology are interdependent. While drones, cyber, and precision fires may reduce reliance on sheer numbers, they require highly trained operators and motivated maintainers – making manpower indispensable. In practice, mass and technology are not opposites but interdependent: without motivated, skilled personnel to operate, sustain, and adapt these tools under pressure, even the most advanced systems lose their strategic value.

But how long should mandatory military service be? Some proponents of conscription argue that nations facing significant external threats need a large military to bolster their defences and deter aggression. While this may hold in principle, a short duration of compulsory military service (i.e. 6 to 8 months) is not sufficient to equip conscripts with the skills demanded by modern high-tech systems and warfare such as communications systems, and electronic and cyberwarfare.

The potential absence of motivation and incentives among conscripts further compounds the lack of training and experience. Unlike professional soldiers, draftees may exhibit lower productivity and commitment due to motivational factors. Between romanticizing military service and understanding what truly drives people to fight, policy makers and military recruiters alike must recognise that willpower is cultivated not through coercion or symbolism, but through fairness, purpose, and trust in institutions – without which conscription risks producing compliance without commitment.

From compliance to conviction

Rather than framing mobilisation solely around fear of adversaries, leaders should articulate, in a meaningful and encouraging way, what is being built and preserved: democratic resilience, societal solidarity, and a Europe capable of shaping its destiny. After all, a soldier will fight not for what it fears in the battlefield, but for what it loves behind it. As an expert in the field, Roderick Parks majestically encapsulates what I can attest from own experience; the real challenge of mobilisation is not demanding loyalty but inspiring belief in a future worth fighting for. This approach moves beyond bureaucratic formalities and encourages mobilisation through confidence in the system, meaning in service, and faith in the society behind the uniform. This signals that all citizens have a role in shaping the future they are asked to defend, regardless of gender, background, or skillset.

The real challenge of mobilisation is not demanding loyalty but inspiring belief in a future worth fighting for.

Notwithstanding, a collective social vision of the future is currently lacking in Europe. When individuals are preoccupied with immediate concerns such as financial insecurity, political instability, or personal stress, it becomes harder for them to think optimistically or creatively about the future. How the population perceives a determined vision of the future is largely influenced by the current crises they are living in. In the countdown Europe now faces, the way we prepare matters – reframing conscription as civic engagement underscores our collective hour of responsibility and thus embodies The Hour of Europe.

Policy recommendations

The return of debates about conscription puts Europe in the spotlight, as it involves more than mere numbers that must increase; it has also become a reflection of the current state of a country’s population and its feelings towards national institutions. Some policy recommendations worth considering are as follows:

1. Institutionalise inclusivity

• Ensure pathways for all citizens – armed service, civil protection, cyber, medical, logistics.
• Adopt gender-neutral frameworks, as in Norway and Sweden, to reinforce fairness and legitimacy.
• Integrate civic education and security literacy in schools.

2. Measure and strengthen the “will to defend”

• Conduct annual, transparent surveys on willingness to defend, disaggregated by gender, age, and region. Germany plans to revamp mandatory military service is a good step in this direction.
• Adjust policy in line with data, making willingness itself a measurable indicator of resilience.
• Address the major concerns across Europe regarding diminished enthusiasm among young to serve their countries.
• Explore the idea of an EU-wide civic or military service framework – voluntary but cooperative.

3. Communicate a shared future vision

• Shift messaging from fear-based narratives to positive visions of Europe’s resilience and unity.
• Use tools like Sweden’s If Crisis or War Comes booklet to normalise preparedness across society, and spread consciousness – not fear.
• Promote the concept of “European defence for peace,” not war.
• Rebrand conscription as service to society, not just service to the military.

4. Invest in training for future warfare

• Adapt conscription to include training in cyber defence, digital literacy, and resilience against disinformation, alongside traditional military roles.
• Partner with private tech industries and universities to create hybrid training programs.
• Invest in Infrastructure and Planning
  • Modernise barracks, training facilities, and digital infrastructure.
  • Ensure administrative systems are ready to scale up if conscription is expanded.
  • Improve training quality and support services to ensure service is a positive, structured experience.

Conclusion: Beyond numbers

The renewed debate about conscription is not just about filling ranks – it is a reflection on the bond between citizens and their institutions, and of whether societies can inspire a vision of the future worth defending. Without conviction, mobilisation risks becoming another bureaucratic exercise.

The Hour of Europe is generational. If Europe wants to project strength and unity, it must engage its younger generations not only as beneficiaries of security, but as participants in shaping it. Ultimately, preparing for the future is less about rediscovering the tools of the past than about reimagining the social contract between citizens and their states. Conscription, in whatever form it takes, should be seen as part of a wider framework of societal resilience – one that blends military readiness with civic empowerment and offers all citizens a stake in Europe’s collective security.

Katja-Elisabeth Herrmann is a HSF 2025 Youth Delegate. Herrmann a works as a European Common Security and Defence Policy trainee at the EU Institute for Security Studies. Before joining the EUISS, Katja completed her voluntary military service in the German Army’s 4th Guard Battalion. She has a background in Transatlantic Affairs from the College of Europe and the Fletcher School and has experience working in different capacities at the NATO Defense College, the European Parliament and the Warsaw Institute. She was awarded a BA in International Relations and an LLB in European Law from the University of Groningen.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Helsinki Security Forum (HSF), the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), or any affiliated institutions with which the author is affiliated.