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Since the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia, Europe and NATO have slowly returned to building conventional deterrence in Europe. The balance in the transatlantic relationship, however, has largely remained intact. While the US has been doing most of the heavy lifting at its own expense, European countries have wasted precious time reminiscing of a world order that no longer exists. Russia’s war in Ukraine, together with President Trump’s rise to power in the United States, have awakened Europe to a new harsh reality. As the US pivots towards the Indo-Pacific region, there are increasing expectations towards European NATO countries to carry a larger burden in developing a credible defence and deterrence posture in Europe.

Russia’s war in Ukraine, together with President Trump’s rise to power in the United States, have awakened Europe to a new harsh reality.

The overall tone of the transatlantic relationship during Trump’s second term has improved markedly over the past six months. The US and Ukraine concluded a partnership on the use of Ukrainian minerals and the EU and US were able to finalise a trade deal. Finally, the 2025 NATO Hague Summit resulted in European pledges to take up greater commitment for their own defence and security.

This all has enabled Trump to claim to his political base the dawn of a more equal transatlantic partnership. Rich Europeans will finally pay out of pocket for their own defence. Post-Hague Trump has largely stuck to flattering European leaders publicly, promised to uphold Article 5, agreed to a new trade deal with the European Union and stepped-up dialogue with European leaders and especially Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy.

At the same time, the transatlantic alliance is facing enormous challenges. Europe’s political cohesion and capacity to secure a just peace in Ukraine are questionable. Meanwhile, President Trump’s deep-seated grievances towards traditional American allies, trade partners and China remain a fundamental undercurrent in America’s new foreign policy priorities.

The Hague Summit defence investment pledge, allocating 3,5% of GDP to core defence requirements and 1,5% to critical infrastructure, civil preparedness, resilience as well as strengthening Europe’s defence industrial base, must be now translated from political rhetoric into action. For European NATO allies, it will mean a commitment to positioning more prepositioned forces at higher readiness, acquiring strategic enabling capabilities, and developing resilient national forces through long-term investment plans. Building a credible European pillar in NATO, a prerequisite for European strategic autonomy, will take years, or more likely, decades.

Building a credible European pillar in NATO, a prerequisite for European strategic autonomy, will take years, or more likely, decades.

Although the Trump administration seems momentarily to be pleased with its European allies, there is no guarantee that this era of positive sentiment will continue in perpetuity. For Europe, a conflict in the Indo-Pacific region could prove a nightmarish scenario, simultaneously drawing limited US attention and resources away from Europe, while increasing pressure on a reluctant but dependent Europe to align with American policies in Asia.

From European point of view, with roughly three and a half years to go, the Trump administration should consider three points when recalibrating US global strategy. First, the transatlantic relationship provides structural advantages for the United States. Although the Allies and NATO as an alliance entail costs and possibly even entrapment risks, they also act as a force multiplier and provide a strong logistical base for US power projection in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. Second, while Russia is not a global rival to the United States, it is a regional adversary in two key regions: Europe and the Arctic. Further, Russia can pose strategic headaches for US and its allies near the Korean peninsula through its partnerships with North Korea and China. Third, the US should practice strategic patience by withholding from hasty unilateral actions which might inadvertently weaken NATO’s deterrence toward Russia and thus risk drawing America into a European conflict.

Finally, US–Russia bilateral talks and Trump’s maneuvering over the war in Ukraine are a source of continuous political tensions between the United States and its European allies. Despite Europe’s internal problems with political cohesion, its position on the war in Ukraine is clear. Sustainable peace in Europe can only be achieved by including Ukraine in the peace talks. Strong support to Ukraine before and after the end of the war are crucial for European security.

Action Plan: 

• Forge a new transatlantic security deal based on a rebalancing of costs and responsibilities. Enable the United States to focus on its competition with China, while negotiating a realistic timeline for Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own security and defence.
• Agree to heavy European long-term investments in strategic enablers and key capabilities, combined with a new unified political vision for a greater European role in global politics.
• Agree that US commitment to NATO’s Article 5 and extended deterrence will continue to be the cornerstones of transatlantic security.
• Coordinate closely prior to any major shift of US resources or capabilities away from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. This is essential to ensure that NATO’s core tasks, deterrence and collective defence in Europe, are not endangered.
• Agree that by waging a war at the heart of Europe, Russia poses a security threat both to Europe and the United States. Ramp up substantial contributions to Ukraine to ensure a sustainable peace and a durable post-war European security architecture.

Iro Särkkä is a Senior Research Fellow in the research programme for Finnish Foreign Policy, Northern European Security and NATO at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Joel Linnainmäki is a Research Fellow in the Finnish foreign policy, Northern European security, and NATO research programme at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

This text was published as part of the HSF 2025 Report on September 2025. You can read all articles from the report here.

Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Martijn Beekman