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Yet the discussion remains largely abstract, raising the more basic question of how to understand “middle powerdom”. Is there a coherent agenda that middle powers pursue, and by what means do they seek to pursue it? Will middle powers “save” multilateral cooperation, or will they rather rebrand it? And where does Europe, whose very DNA is rooted in multilateralism, fit into the picture?

Scholars and pundits often describe a middle power as a state with considerable power that nonetheless falls short of great-power status. Middle powers cannot shape the international system on their own, but they can exert influence through so-called niche diplomacy and active engagement on specific issues where they hold expertise or capacity. They often position themselves as mediators in global affairs, with a marked preference for multilateral solutions. Australia, Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and Turkey are among the states most frequently cited as examples.

Middle powers stand to lose out when the rules-based international order is in decline.

The debate on middle powers reveals a few commonalities among this otherwise diverse grouping of countries. To start with, the term “middle power” is a form of self-identification. Carney’s Canada and Anthony Albanese’s Australia readily embrace the label, and many smaller states have followed suit, as it helps leaders explain their foreign policy course to domestic audiences in turbulent times. Second, what middle powers have in common is that they stand to lose out when the rules-based international order is in decline or when multilateralism comes under threat. They share the will not to let competition between the United States and China become the sole determinant of the future international order. Third, middle powers express a genuine willingness to treat emerging states from the Global South as important partners in sustaining multilateral cooperation. They describe themselves as bridge-builders between the old order and the new one that is slowly taking shape.

The middle power narrative, therefore, has a common thread. Their battle cry as custodians of the rules-based order and saviours of multilateral cooperation in institutionally and normatively dire times has obvious appeal. Underlying it is a plea for “second-tier” states to act as active agents, not passive bystanders, at a time when the foundations and contours of the international order are being overhauled.

In protecting and revamping multilateral cooperation, the tools available to and utilised by middle powers are not, per se, unique. While they openly embrace loose networking beyond formal institutional cooperation as well as “ad hocism”, the chosen formats depend on the issue at hand and are often described through concepts such as variable geometry, flexilateralism or multi-alignment. Working with a broad range of partners in different constellations, including through informal networks such as the G20 or the BRICS, is a sign of middle powerdom in action. The essence of middle power cooperation is thus rooted in pragmatism and a recognition that values are not universally shared. For the EU, the challenge is to defend multilateral cooperation without insisting that it must always take place through existing institutions.

The real test is how much agency middle powers can exercise in a system still dominated by great powers.

Indeed, one of the important dilemmas for middle powerdom is the absence of a shared agenda or common ideological backbone. A critical fault line separates Canada, Japan, and the Nordics from Global South middle powers such as India, Turkey, Indonesia, Brazil and South Africa. The former aim to preserve the largely Western-created order that has generally served their interests, while the latter not only seek a stronger voice within it but also strive to substantially reform the current international system, including its institutions and norms.

Clout in international relations is also needed to provide public goods and address contemporary global challenges. This leaves middle powers in a paradoxical position: while great-power disengagement is accepted as a political reality, in practice they remain dependent on major powers. Many, including those in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, are also reluctant to alienate their allies, which leaves it unclear to what degree middle powerdom depends on the dominant states. Moreover, the discussions rarely ask whether the United States and China would, in practice, tolerate these countries exercising greater autonomy and influence. The real test, then, is how much agency middle powers can exercise in a system still dominated by great powers.

Why does this matter now?

Intensifying great-power rivalry is weakening multilateral cooperation at a time when global challenges require more, not less, collective action.

What needs to change?

Middle powers need to become better able to advance their interests and values independently of great powers, especially the United States.

What needs to be done?

Middle power governments, as well as the EU and its member states, should use their collective leverage to secure binding commitments and institutional reform, strengthen domestic support, and pursue networked cooperation alongside traditional alliances.