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Escalation management, the more widely used concept and one preferred by both the Biden and Trump administrations, focuses on avoiding unacceptable escalation while pursuing military-strategic goals. Its corollary strategy is to use deterrent threats to prevent the enemy from taking escalatory actions, while exercising restraint to avoid provoking an escalatory response. Formulated as a question, the concept asks: how can escalation be kept at acceptable levels?

There is little evidence that European countries have fully grasped what it would mean to fight a war under a nuclear shadow.

Intrawar deterrence proceeds from the premise that mutual deterrence is an unavoidable feature of war. Deterrence does not stop at the outbreak of hostilities but will be waged like war is waged. The central problem the concept invites us to address, then, is how to deter the enemy from taking certain actions in order to secure the best possible war outcome. The concept asks how deterrent threats can be employed effectively to achieve decisive influence over the enemy.

There is overlap between the two concepts. A degree of restraint is a necessary part of any intrawar deterrence strategy – or indeed any sane strategy – under conditions of mutual strategic nuclear deterrence. Escalation management, for its part, also includes deterrent threats. The difference lies in the central objectives of the two concepts, escalation or influence over the enemy. This explains the prominent role of restraint in strategies premised on escalation management. The Russo-Ukrainian War, which informs much thinking on both concepts, offers an interesting case study.

During war, an escalation management strategy invites probing the adversary’s red lines instead of supporting military operations effectively. During the Russo-Ukrainian War, this resulted in an a priori assumption that almost any significant expansion of military aid to Ukraine had to be preceded by testing the waters. Moreover, the same assumption impeded effective military operations, as was the case with restraints placed on striking Russian territory with certain weapons. Particularly troubling for NATO, however, is that the relative weight escalation management places on restraint effectively validates an aggressor’s strategy of nuclear coercion before war has even broken out. Such signals can contribute to an aggressor’s perception that a viable pathway to victory exists, thereby weakening deterrence.

One may question what Ukraine’s prospects for a tolerable war outcome would be had it throughout the war exercised the degree of restraint favoured by escalation management – for example, by shelving Operation Spiderweb in order to preserve the air leg of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.

The assumption behind the need for restraint is sometimes driven by the belief that geographic proximity to the territory in dispute determines how much each side has at stake. Under this theory, Russia is perceived to have more at stake in a potential Russia-NATO war than most NATO Allies. Yet this assumption overlooks the fact that there are no territorial disputes between Russia and NATO countries, and that the defending NATO country would therefore, like Ukraine, have more at stake than the aggressor in any likely Russia-NATO war. Moreover, any Russia-NATO war would be about the security architecture of entire Europe, resulting in European powers having a strong interest in preventing Russia’s hegemonic aspirations. The same reasoning also gives too little weight to characteristics of Russia’s dictatorial regime, including its instinct for self-preservation and a degree of risk aversion, which lead to Russia itself having a tendency to engage in probing, both in domestic and foreign policy. Despite the danger it poses to Europe, Russia is a deterrable state.

Ultimately, the choice between escalation management and intrawar deterrence comes down to whether to emphasise fighting a war safely or deterring its outbreak in the first place

The corollary assumption has generally been that even defeat in a war of aggression would threaten the dictator’s regime, which could lead him to turn to nuclear weapons in an effort to save himself. Why such a grave escalation would necessarily reduce rather than increase the perceived risk to the regime remains unclear if sufficient deterrent threats are made – especially since turning to domestic security forces and repression to counter challenges to the regime remains another option.

An intrawar deterrence strategy would address this problem by making clear that NATO will pursue its aim to restore the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its members while deterring actions that threaten its ability to achieve those goals. A decision to invade NATO, or to escalate in order to avoid defeat during the war, would heighten risks for the regime rather than lower them, tipping the scales toward adversary restraint. Such a deterrence posture would be more in tune with the realities of Russia’s strategic culture, political system and role of warfare in its foreign policy.

Ultimately, the choice between escalation management and intrawar deterrence comes down to whether to emphasise fighting a war safely or deterring its outbreak in the first place. Making war safer for Russia’s leaders, however, will increase its likelihood, which in turn increases existential risks for all involved powers, even those geographically distant.

Why does this matter now?

Strengthening NATO’s deterrence posture requires associated strategic thought.

What needs to change?

NATO needs to make intrawar deterrence a central component of its military strategy.

What needs to be done?

NATO adoption of an intrawar deterrence strategy should also be reflected in practical-level work, particularly in wargaming.