Publications

Today in Ukraine, there is a warm early-autumn rain. That means one thing: fewer drones fly along the frontline, but trenches fill with mud up to the knees. This is one of the unexpected cause-and-effect connections you learn when living through a brutal war.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has exposed uncomfortable truths about our assumptions of security. It forces us to rethink what security means and how to prepare for future challenges. Based on Ukraine’s experience, I highlight three insights Europe must urgently include in its security strategy.

1. Global Security Architecture

The first lesson is clear: the modern global architecture of peace and security has failed its test. When a dictator is ruthless and unrestrained, neither deterrence mechanisms nor collective enforcement work.

Ukraine knows this painfully well. The phrase “Budapest Memorandum” cuts deep into our national memory – a paper that never protected us for even a single day. Today, new currents in US politics cast doubt on NATO’s reliability in its present form. Sanctions and diplomatic isolation, while important, have not restricted the aggressor’s ability to finance war.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has exposed uncomfortable truths about our assumptions of security.

The harsh reality is that authoritarian states have proved faster, more unified, and more ruthless than democracies in crisis. They mobilise entire societies, redirect economies towards war, and ignore human lives or moral restraints. A simple comparison illustrates this: in North Korea, a 152 mm artillery shell costs roughly $300; in Pennsylvania, a comparable 155 mm shell costs about $3,000. Thousands are consumed daily.

Yet there is room for optimism. Despite the paralysis of multilateral mechanisms, Europe and the free world improvised effective responses: bilateral and coalition agreements, emergency aid, joint training missions, rapid political decisions. These flexible arrangements allowed Ukraine to resist. The lesson is that security solutions emerge most effectively under extreme conditions. Europe must reform its institutions, and the future of European security may rest not on outdated frameworks but on modern networks of binding agreements.

2. Forces on the Ground

The second lesson is that when fighting an authoritarian state, nothing matters more than the situation on the ground. Diplomacy, negotiations, humanitarian exchanges, and sanctions all have their place, but leverage at the table depends on whether your soldier holds a trench near a forgotten village. For the aggressor, only the argument of force carries weight.

There is a temptation to imagine that technology — drones, robotics, artificial intelligence — will replace conventional arms. Certainly, these are the future, but the Ukrainian experience shows they cannot substitute for artillery shells, logistics, or infantry control of terrain. If your artillery is silent, logistics broken, or infantry absent, no innovation can compensate.

Modern war is also a war of economies: victory belongs to the side that can produce more, cheaper, and more effective weapons at scale. Ukrainians discovered that welding a simple cage or hanging a net over a road was an effective defence against FPV drones. A $50 drone can destroy a million-dollar vehicle. This is the brutal arithmetic of war.

The courage of Ukraine’s soldiers proves that with support, even darkness can be faced with dignity.

Large-scale war, even in the 21st century, is still fought by people in muddy trenches, supported by machines. Rockets and drones fly, tanks and pickups drive, but the infantryman still sits in the same wet dugout as in the First World War. This requires trained soldiers, resilient economies, and industrial capacity to sustain the fight.

For Europe, the lesson is stark: it is time to rebuild independent military power. This is not about militarism or ambition. It is about security – about protecting lives, values, and ideals. The courage of Ukraine’s soldiers proves that with support, even darkness can be faced with dignity. Europe must stop pretending it can “buy its way out” of threats and instead embrace responsibility and strategic thinking.

3. Democratic Resilience & Disinformation

The third lesson is that while soldiers endure hell at the front, the enemy always seeks to reach deep into the rear – into the minds of people and the stability of systems.

Disinformation and propaganda are not new, but the internet and globalisation have transformed them into one of the most powerful weapons of hybrid war. Russia has perfected the toxic combination of old Soviet propaganda with modern tools: bot networks, artificial intelligence, influence operations, and targeted manipulation of social media.

This battle is not confined to cyberspace. Missile strikes on civilian and energy infrastructure are also psychological weapons – designed to break morale as much as to cripple the economy. Coordinated influence efforts can mobilise marginal groups to commit sabotage or erode public trust in institutions. They can distort perceptions so severely that mobilisation falters, or cohesion collapses. Disinformation can even reach into families of soldiers, civil activists, and elected officials – undermining resilience at its roots.

This is why information security is not a secondary front but a central pillar of modern defence. The enemy’s aim is to discredit governments, fracture societies, influence elections, and paralyse mobilisation. Europe must recognise that resilience against disinformation is as vital as tanks and missiles.

War is a catastrophe. Ukraine knows this all too well. But war also reveals truths that we found more convenient to ignore. Today, Europe is already drawn into the struggle – but worse may yet come.

The heroes of Ukraine’s defence have given Europe precious time at the cost of their own lives. This time must not be wasted. Europe must use it wisely, bravely, and strategically.

The hour of Europe has come.

Maksym Antonenko is a HSF 2025 Youth Delegate. Antonenko is an expert in information policy and assistant to a Member of the Ukrainian Parliament. He advises communities and political organisations on issues of information policy, security, and gov tech and is a young researcher in political science. Antoneko is also a co-founder of a charitable foundation providing aid to frontline areas in Ukraine.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Helsinki Security Forum (HSF) or any affiliated institutions with which the author is affiliated.

Photo: Vadym Pliashechko / State Border Guard Service of Ukraine